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Abstract
This paper considers a two-period optimal contracting model in which
firms make new hires in the second period subject to the constraint that
they cannot pay discriminate either against or in favour of the new hires.
Under an assumption on the information available to workers, it is shown
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This paper investigates the consequences, for wage and employment outcomes, of
assuming that …rms follow a fair wage policy. By a fair wage policy is meant that
workers receive equal pay for equal work, irrespective of when they were hired.
The analysis is conducted in the context of a competitive labour market model,
and so it abstracts from aspects of imperfect competition often introduced in order
to explain wage rigidity. Likewise, issues of adverse selection or moral hazard are
abstracted from, so that there is no e¢ciency wage element to the analysis. Instead
an attempt is made to concentrate solely on the e¤ects of linking together the pay
of new hires with that of incumbents. The imposition of the fair wage restriction
leads to reduced wage volatility and increased employment variability, as well as
involuntary unemployment.
A fair wage policy implies that if the contract wage of incumbent workers is
not equal to the auction wage, then the same is true of the wage paid to new
hires. There may be good reasons why wage contracts for incumbents should not
specify auction wages; this need not of itself imply ine¢cient employment decisions
as far as this group of workers is concerned (a point which dogged the theory of
implicit contracts). If, however, these same wages must be paid to new hires then
a divergence from auction wages will generally lead to ine¢cient hiring decisions
being made.3 In the model explored in this paper, a fair wage policy can lead to
wage rigidity due to a di¢culty in both raising the current contract wage upwards
when the labour market is tight, and in reducing the wage when it is slack.
The upward rigidity is based on what I shall call the ‘wage-bill argument’.4
In essence the wage-bill argument is very simple. Suppose a …rm needs to make
3This paper takes the point of view that the e¢ciency or otherwise of the hiring decision
is of more importance than that of the layo¤ decision. While the existence and e¢ciency of
layo¤s have traditionally been a major concern of contract theory, they are not in practice very
important in ‡uctuations (except possibly in major downturns): according to Hall and Lilien
(1986), temporary layo¤s do not contribute very much to total unemployment in the U.S.A.; in
the U.K., during 1977-84 most variation in unemployment was due to changes in the rate at which
workers leave unemployment (Pissarides (1986)). Likewise, in a recent study using detailed data
on …rm separations, Gautier, van den Berg, van Ours, and Ridder (1999) found that the total
separation rate did not change very much with the level of economic activity.
4This term has also been used di¤erently by Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980), who argue, by
showing that workers can be retained and more insurance o¤ered at no cost to the wage bill, that
the canonical implicit contract model cannot explain layo¤s.
1new hires but the wage it would have to pay is above the wage which it is currently
paying its workforce. Then, under the equal pay assumption, it faces a choice: either
make the new hires and raise wages for all of its workforce, or leave wages where
they were. The increase in the wage bill for the incumbent workers might make the
former choice too expensive even if, considered alone, the potential new hires would
be pro…table.5 For the downward rigidity, suppose that the wage at which the …rm
can hire is now lower than the wage being paid to incumbents. By the equal pay
assumption, if the …rm was to hire at the lower wage it would also have to pay its
incumbents less. Obviously the …rm would be happy to do this, but the incumbents
would be correspondingly unhappy. I shall explore one particular model of why
it may not be possible for wages to be lowered. The model assumes asymmetric
information so that incumbent workers do not know how tight the labour market is.
Then it may not be possible to have an incentive compatible wage contract with the
incumbents in which the wage can be lowered (since the …rm would always want to
claim that the outside wage is low).
Working through the equilibria of the model, there is reduced wage variability
relative to a model where the equal pay assumption is not invoked. In addition
there will be increased employment variability, and the possibility of involuntary
unemployment (and even involuntary layo¤s). The increased employment variability
might seem counter-intuitive in view of the idea of the wage-bill argument which
applies in a “good” state of the world when a …rm chooses not to employ new
workers because of the extra costs of paying incumbents more, so that although the
wage does not rise, neither does employment. In equilibrium, however, …rms will
set contract wages close to the auction wage in the good state of the world and will
hire at the auction wage in this state. Because the wage is set at a relatively high
level, in a “bad” state of the world the …rm will choose to hire fewer workers than
would be the case with a ‡exible wage. In addition, new workers who are not hired
in the bad state will be involuntarily unemployed. The reason why a …rm does not
set the contract wage near to the auction wage pertinent to the bad state is that a
5At …rst sight this argument might appear to be stating no more than the problem faced
by a monopsonist: employing more workers entails an increased wage to be paid to all. Such
an interpretation would not be correct however. The argument given here applies even when the
labour market is competitive. The crucial distinction is that the traditional monopsonist argument
is relevant when the …rm is making a single decision about the desired workforce, whereas the
argument here applies to a situation where the decision to make new hires is subsequent to, and
the wage paid independent of, the initial hiring decision.
2…rm which does this will not choose, by the wage-bill argument, to raise its wage
to hire in the good state. It is as if it is committing itself to a low wage. Hence,
although it gains by being able to hire cheaply in this bad state, it cannot hire in
the good state, and the latter loss outweighs the former gain.6
There are a number of theories of downward rigid wages, many of them based
on arguments which prevent unemployed workers from undercutting the wages of
incumbents (see Section 1.1 for discussion of some of these). In the two-period com-
petitive contracting equilibrium analysed here, with shocks in period 2 to the value
product of labour, however, downward rigidity on its own will not a¤ect equilibrium
levels of employment. It would only be necessary to pay a su¢ciently low period-2
wage to ensure e¢cient employment decisions can be made in bad states, compen-
sating workers with higher period-1 wages. In good period-2 states, the …rm can
hire new workers if necessary at a higher wage than that being paid to incumbents.
Introducing the equal pay assumption, however, means that a …rm wishing to hire
in good states must o¤er all workers a high wage, and this forces the optimal con-
tract to specify a relatively high second period wage, as already explained. Thus
the upward rigidity arising from the wage-bill argument is crucial to the results.
While the formal model of the paper uses an optimal contracting framework in
the presence of asymmetric information, the underlying idea is much more general.
There is evidence that …rms in many industries follow “wage policies”. One …rm may
pay higher or lower wages than other …rms within the same industry to seemingly
identical workers; wages do not seem to vary one-for-one according to ‡uctuations
in marginal value products of workers, either cross-sectionally within a …rm (“pay
compression”) nor over time. In particular, wages are often associated with jobs,
and may be relatively unresponsive to hiring conditions. See Manning (1996) for a
discussion of the evidence. A possible reason for the stability of such wage policies
is due to the wage-bill argument. Suppose that incumbent workers are unlikely to
leave the …rm even if they could earn more elsewhere. This can be due to costs of
search, relocation, training, as well as non-pecuniary factors that attach them to the
…rm. Under the equal pay assumption, a …rm paying a lower wage than competitors
would have little incentive to raise wages, even if it would wish to pay more to new
6Ex ante, the wagebill saving in the good state to a low wage …rm is of no bene…t. A worker who
signed up for such a …rm will anticipate that the wage will remain low. Thus the ex post incentive
to save on wage costs by not hiring in the good state does not produce an ex ante saving in wages
since a worker will have to be compensated (in the …rst period of the model) for low future wages.
3hires, as it would have to pay all its workers more, and not raising the wage may
not lead to (too many) quits. Likewise a tightening of the labour market may have
little impact on the wage being paid, for the same reason. A wage policy, once
established, is likely to persist.
1.1 On the Equal Pay Assumption
The equal pay for equal work restriction is commonly used in theoretical work (see
Section 4), but is it a reasonable assumption? By simply imposing the restriction,
I am implicitly assuming the existence of a social norm which demands equal pay.
There is justi…cation for this approach. Certainly there are well documented exam-
ples (see Fitzroy (1999) for a recent one), where workers are paid the same wage
irrespective of when they were hired and under what labour market conditions. This
is even true despite clear productivity di¤erences between workers, which suggests
that a wage is associated with the job description rather than the actual produc-
tivity of the worker. Likewise, there are exceptions which arguably prove the rule,
such as the two-tier wage policies introduced following deregulation of airlines in
the U.S., where low morale, non-cooperation between di¤erently salaried employ-
ees, and inappropriate conduct towards passengers were much in evidence (Salpukas
(1987)). Personnel management texts treat the need for equitable pay as virtually
self-evident: “The need for equity is perhaps the most important factor in deter-
mining pay rates....Pay rates must ... be equitable internally in that each employee
should view his or her pay as equitable given other employees’ pay rates in the same
organization” Dessler (1984, p. 223), quoted in Akerlof and Yellen (1990)).
Still, this begs the question of why such a norm might exist. A number of
explanations have been o¤ered. A standard explanation is that workers worry about
relative pay as well as absolute pay, and wage di¤erences can a¤ect morale and hence
productivity. A recent statement of this position is found in Bewley (1998), based
on observations from a large scale interview survey:
Downward rigidity of the pay of new hires derives from that of existing
employees, because all pay rates within a …rm are tied together. Reduced
hiring pay increases di¤erentials between existing and new employees in each
job, unless the pay of existing employees is cut as well. The higher di¤erentials
4violate established standards of equity incorporated in a company’s internal
pay structure, angering new employees when they discover they are underpaid.
Internal pay structure is a set of rules relating pay to position, skill, seniority
or contribution. This structure is created in large part to achieve internal
equity, which is both uniformity in the application of the rules setting pay
and a set of beliefs about fair relations between pay and its determinants.
Managers regarded any violation of internal equity as potentially dis-
ruptive. Lack of equity spawns jealousies, resentments, and perceptions of
unjust treatment. (p.477)
It can be objected to this line of thinking, however, that even if the relatively
underpaid perform less well than otherwise, the overpaid may work harder, and it is
not clear that the latter is o¤set by the former (see Lazear (1991)). Equity theory,
as proposed by social psychologists (see Adams (1963)), is one theoretical approach
which can explain concern with relative pay. It is based on the idea that individuals
(here: workers) have a clear idea of a fair relationship between inputs (their work)
and outputs (their pay), and deviations from this lead to attempts by the worker
to re-establish a fair relationship by varying actual or perceived inputs. Thus a
worker who receives less than fair pay may respond by reducing e¤ort in order to
re-establish a fair relationship between inputs and outputs (see, e.g., Fehr, Gächter,
and Kirchsteiger (1996) for experimental evidence in support of the hypothesis that
e¤ort responds positively to the wage). Likewise a worker who receives more, might
respond by increasing e¤ort, though there is an argument that in this case it is easier
to restore a fair relationship by increasing ‘perceived’ e¤ort (e.g., the worker re-
evaluates her belief about the quality of her work in an upwards direction). Akerlof
and Yellen (1990) argue that one can interpret the experimental evidence to say
that equity theory supports a model where underpaid workers reduce their e¤ort,
while overpaid workers do not increase e¤ort, which is one answer to the objection
raised by Lazear. In such a model, the costs in terms of reduced e¤ort of paying
s o m ew o r k e r sl e s st h a no t h e r ss i m p l ym a ye x c e e dt h es a v i n g si nt e r m so fl o w e r
wages. In the economic literature, most discussion of the equity issue has been in
the context of explaining “pay compression”, that is to say, having a wage structure
in which wages do not vary as much as individual workers’ productivities (which is
generally thought to obtain in organizations). This is true of the Akerlof and Yellen
(1990) paper. Lazear (1989) has argued that pay compression might be optimal in
5industries where cooperation between workers is important (its absence can imply
a motivation to ensure other workers perform badly). Pay compression, however,
is in a sense much stronger than what I am assuming, as all workers have identical
productivities here (ignoring training costs), di¤ering only according to the time of
hiring.7
Apart from ideas linked to fairness, equity and cooperation, there may also
be more conventional economic arguments to suggest why new workers cannot be
brought in at a wage lower than that paid to incumbents due to the possibility
that a …rm might use this to replace its current expensive workforce. Moore (1983)
shows that if it is necessary to retain at least one worker to train the new employees,
then there is a unique von Neumann-Morgernstern stable set consisting of con…g-
urations in which all workers receive the same wage. Gottfries (1992) argues on
the basis of the di¢culty of distinguishing between voluntary quits and …res (e.g.,
due to the possibility that employers can induce quits by making life unpleasant
for an employee: see Carmichael (1983), MacLeod and Malcomson (1989)) that a
wage di¤erential would give an employer the incentive to replace as many workers
as possible (this idea is more fully worked out in Gottfries and Sjostrom (1998)).
Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980) also argue that paying a lower wage to new hires might
create an incentive for the …rm to replace the current workforce. On the other hand,
there may be good reputation arguments for why a …rm might resist bringing in new
workers at a higher wage than that being paid to incumbents: it might damage the
…rm’s reputation for not responding to workers’ attempts to use their bargaining
power to increase their wages. Incumbents might reason that if new workers can be
paid more, then it will be worth them too bargaining for higher pay (as suggested
by Manning (1996)).
A possible objection to the equal pay assumption is that many …rms operate
seniority ladders which can be used to wage discriminate. There are a number of
points to be made here. First, if pay relativities are …xed then a …rm may not,
for example, be able to bene…t from a low outside wage unless it can cut the wage
rate attached to the lowest seniority. A second point relates to the fact that the
wage-bill argument applies here when the labour market was tight,s ot h a tt oa v o i d
7In this case theoretical papers often simply treat the assumption as virtually self-evident. For
example Carruth and Oswald (1987) state (p.432) that “a two-tier system of discriminatory wage
payments ...[is]...almost never observed in the world.”
6this problem, a …rm would have to hire new workers at a higher seniority than
existing workers. This seems more implausible than the reverse scenario, though
if the only constraint is that a …rm cannot hire at a wage higher than that being
paid to incumbents, it could achieve a …rst best outcome by paying all incumbents
a …xed wage close to the highest possible spot wage, and making all new hires at
the spot wage; the problem with this is that a high (period 2 in the model) wage
for the incumbents would need to be compensated by low or even negative wages
at the point of hiring (period 1) which might be infeasible; moreover a very large
di¤erential between incumbents and new hires might well exacerbate the incentives
already remarked upon for employers to force “voluntary” quits. A third point is
that the equal pay assumption might be more appropriate for less skilled workers,
while pay discrimination is arguably more prevalent amongst the more skilled. Thus
the implications of the paper might be more relevant for the former group, and may
thus contribute towards an explanation for why unemployment rates tend to be
more prone to variation amongst the less skilled; see, e.g., van Ours and Ridder
(1995) and Hoynes (1999). This observation is also consistent with evidence that in
low-wage industries, wages respond less to changes in value products than they do
in high-wage industries (Johansen (1999)).
1.2 Outline of Paper
In Section 2, the basic model is described. In Subsection 2.1, conditions are outlined
under which the implementation of an e¢cient allocation is possible. In Subsection
2.2, a symmetric ine¢cient equilibrium is characterised, with wages which do not
vary su¢ciently to allow for e¢cient levels of hiring in the bad state; this leads
to involuntary unemployment. In Subsection 2.3, a situation is considered where
the symmetric equilibrium fails to exist. An asymmetric equilibrium is analysed, in
which some …rms pay low period-2 wages and do not hire in the good state, while
other …rms pay higher wages and do hire. The properties of this equilibrium remain
similar in that there are ine¢ciently low numbers of hires in the bad state, and
involuntary unemployment in the sense that workers who fail to get a job envy those
who succeed in getting a job with a high-wage …rm. In Section 3, the possibility
of layo¤s is introduced. In a state with asymmetric shocks, laid-o¤ workers may
…nd employment with another …rm. It is shown that the wage-bill problem can lead
7to excessive layo¤s when all …rms receive a bad shock. Moreover, such layo¤s are
involuntary. Section 4 discusses related literature in which the equal assumption
plays a major role, and Section 5 contains concluding comments.
2T h e M o d e l
As already mentioned, the wage-bill argument is developed under the assumption
that both workers and …rms are risk-neutral and that the information upon which
a labour contract can be conditioned is very limited. The assumption that workers
and …rms are risk neutral implies that there is no risk-sharing motive for reducing
the variability of wages. Instead we shall demonstrate that reduced variability of
wages, in comparison to the predictions of the standard competitive model, can
result from the interplay of the wage bill argument and asymmetric information.8
The model is partial equilibrium. In the …rst period of a two-period model,
…rms enter into (binding) contracts with workers. First period demand is certain,
and …rms produce and pay a wage to their workers. At the end of the …rst period, a
randomly selected fraction (1 ¡ °) of a …rm’s labour force leaves the labour market
and is replaced by an equal number of one-period lived new entrants. In the second
period, the value product of labour is uncertain (but common to all …rms) and it
is assumed that there is a bad (low value product) state and a good (high value)
state. Once the uncertainty is realised, …rms decide whether to hire (or …re) and
what wage to pay, consistent with any contract, and subject to the constraint that
all workers receive the same wage.
With completely contingent contracts and risk neutrality, the restriction that
all workers receive the same wage does not a¤ect the allocation. A contract which
speci…es the spot wage in each state in period 2 can achieve this. It is assumed,
however, that a labour contract can only be conditioned on information directly
8The asymmetric information assumption is by no means necessary for the general argument to
go through. An alternative model might assume that workers are risk averse, so that an optimal
contract with the incumbents will avoid excessive wage variability and for this reason it may not be
desirable to reduce the wage to market clearing levels. The asymmetric assumption is somewhat
stronger than that traditionally made in the implicit contract literature which e¤ectively assumes
that aggregate labor supply is observable to workers (e.g., Chari (1983), Green and Kahn (1983)
and Grossman and Hart (1981)). It does however lead to a form of contract that is arguably more
in accordance with observations—a …xed wage is speci…ed and the employer chooses employment
levels unilaterally (Oswald (1986)).
8veri…able by an individual worker, namely, apart from the date, his employment
status (which I assume is either fully employed or laid-o¤). Similarly, in the absence
of the equal wage restriction, the non-contingent contract will have no a¤ect on the
allocation as compared to a contingent contracts equilibrium. Since the period 2
employment decision can e¤ectively be taken independently of the wage being paid
to incumbents, an e¢cient employment decision concerning new hires will be made
in period 2. It is the combination of the two assumptions which drives the results.
The form of the non-contingent contract is justi…ed by assuming that the state
of nature and the employment level of the …rm and any of its correlates are unob-
servable to the worker, or at least unveri…able.9 Under this assumption, the contract
cannot make the second period wage contingent on the state of nature,10 and the
competitive allocation may no longer be implementable. In a bad state of nature,
t h e… r mw i l ln o tb ea b l et oc u tt h ew a g eb e l o wt h a ts p e c i … e di nt h ec o n t r a c t ,w h i c h
means there may be unemployed workers willing to work at a wage strictly below
their marginal product, but the …rm cannot employ them because of the equal pay
restriction. The only way to avoid this is to specify in the contract a low second
period wage—equal to a new worker’s supply price in the bad state. The drawback
of doing this is that in the good state the wage bill argument might apply—…rms
would rather stay at a low wage with their existing workforce than expand, even
though the cost of newly hired workers would be smaller than their additional out-
9In many contexts a …rm’s employment level may be di¢cult to de…ne precisely; it may be
possible to shift production or aspects of production to other …rms, or plants of the same …rm
if the contracts are plant level contracts. (See Stiglitz (1986) for elaboration of this point.) The
assumption also rules out the wage being conditioned on the going wage for new hires. This makes
less sense in a competitive labour market than it would in a monopsonistic or search environment
where “the going wage” is not well de…ned. Even if employment was observable, it does not seem
unreasonable to suppose that contracts which made the wage contingent on the …rm’s employment
would be met with a high degree of suspicion by employees, who would be required to understand
not only the …rm’s decision problem but also possible market conditions in order to calculate what
such a contract was worth. (This is not to deny that the equilibrium constructed here also makes
strong demands on a worker’s computational abilities: he or she has to …gure out that in high
demand states the wage will rise to the market clearing level.)
10This need not be inconsistent with the results of …rm surveys which suggest that a major reason
for …rms not cutting pay in recessions is that worker morale will su¤er (see especially Blinder and
Choi (1990), Campbell and Kamlani (1997), and Bewley (1998)), if this is due to a feeling that
the …rm has breached an implicit agreement not to cut wages; as Bewley (1998, p. 480) puts it:
“the main drawback of paycuts is that they …ll the air with disappointment and an impression of
breached promise [emphasis added].” It is conceivable that this potential reduction in morale is the
means by which the implicit contract is enforced, a suggestion made by Campbell and Kamlani
(1997), as opposed to the alternative interpretation of why morale might su¤er based around a “fair
wage” theory. Experimental evidence that implicit contracts can be enforced by such reciprocity
can be found in Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger (1997).
9put. I shall …nd cases where this con‡ict leads to all …rms specifying a period 2 wage
which is higher than the bad state supply price of labour, and consequently where
there is too little employment in the bad state (and involuntary unemployment).
There may also exist situations in which some …rms choose the lower wage, and this
leads (additionally) to ine¢ciently low employment in such …rms in the good state.
In more detail, there are two periods, 1 and 2, and a large number of …rms in
a competitive industry, each having an identical revenue function f(l, M), where
l ¸ 0 is employment and M>0 is a productivity or revenue shock. It is assumed
that @f=@l is linear and given by @f=@l(l;M)=M ¡ ®l for l · M=® (and zero
otherwise). Note that M is an additive common shock across …rms. There is no
uncertainty in period 1, with M = m, while in period 2, M = ml with probability pl
and M = mh with probability ph ´ 1¡pl, 0 <p l < 1,a n dml <m h. For notational
convenience I shall write f(l) ´ f(l;m);f l(l) ´ f(l;ml); and fh(l) ´ f(l;mh): In
each period the industry speci…c supply of labour, divided by the number of …rms,
is L, with each worker withdrawing from the market at the end of period 1 with
probability (1¡°) (exogenous separations), and (1¡°)L (per …rm) of new workers
appearing in period 2. It is not known ex ante which workers will withdraw, and it
is assumed that the number of workers employed by each …rm is large, so that it can
be taken that a precise fraction (1 ¡ °) of a …rm’s period 1 workforce withdraws.11
It is assumed that workers are expected utility maximizers, being risk neutral
with zero discount rate, and having a disutility of work of u per period. Consequently
for wages above reservation utility, aggregate labour supply is inelastically supplied
at level L per …rm. (Note that hours of work are not variable in this analysis).
I fap e r i o d1w o r k e rl e a v e st h el a b o u rm a r k e ta tt h ee n do fp e r i o d1 ,t h e nh e
receives zero utility in period 2. Thus the utility of a period 1 worker who receives a
contract specifying a wage w1 in period 1 and a possibly random wage e w2 in period
2i sw1 + °Ee w2,w h e r eE e w2 is the expectation of wh
2, assuming that the worker is
employed (i.e., not laid o¤) in all dates/states. Firms are similarly assumed to be
risk neutral with zero discount rate, and to maximise expected discounted pro…ts.
11It is not strictly necessary for the argument that ° should be less than 1 as long as there are
new entrants in period 2. Likewise a similar argument could be made in a one-period model, in
which new workers become available after the state of nature is revealed. Nevertheless neither
feature complicates the analysis unduly, and the idea of turnover is important for the spirit of the
analysis, while in a one-period model it is more di¢cult to justify why a …rm shouldn’t wait until
the state of nature is revealed before hiring.
10I will make assumptions which ensure that it is not e¢cient to hire workers in
period 1 and replace them with new workers in period 2 (otherwise the …rst-best
allocation could be achieved by such one-period employment contracts). A natural
way of doing this is—adopted here—is to assume that there are training costs of t
per worker. If these are su¢ciently high, the bene…ts from moving to one-period
contracts in terms of wage ‡exibility will be o¤set by the additional training costs.12
I shall return to this point below, but for the moment the possibility of a …rm
simultaneously laying o¤ workers and taking on new entrants will be ignored.
As already discussed, a labour contract can only be made contingent on a
worker’s employment status. This implies that a contract will specify a wage for
period 1, w1, and a wage for period 2, w2, together with lay-o¤ pay wL
2 if the worker
is laid o¤ in period 2: However, for the moment I shall make assumptions which
ensure that all period 1 workers will be retained in period 2, so lay-o¤ pay can be
ignored.
Initially, I shall suppose that, for simplicity’s sake, the bad state in period 2
is such that at full employment (i.e., L workers per …rm) the MVP is no greater
than the disutility of work plus training cost, but in period 1 and in the good
state in period 2, MVP exceeds (or equals) the disutility of work plus training
cost, so that e¢ciency requires possibly less than full employment in the bad state,
but full employment in the latter two situations. I shall additionally assume that
productivity in the bad state is such that some new workers should be taken on:
Case 1 f0
l(L) · u+t and f0(L);f0
h(L) ¸ u+t (i.e., m, mh ¸ u+®L+t ¸ ml);
and f0
l(°L) > u + t.
Because of the fact that …rms should take on new workers in both period 2
states, as mentioned above, layo¤s can be ignored. To see that the wage-bill argu-
ment can prevent the implementation of the contingent contracts allocation (which
must be Pareto e¢cient), note that it is necessary (but not su¢cient) to imple-
12If the state of nature is observable but not contractible, can one-period contracts do better
than long-term contracts by allowing for potential ‡exibility in w2? Without attempting a formal
analysis of this situation, it is easy to conceive of circumstances under which short-term contracts
are not superior to long-term contracts. For example, suppose that workers su¤er a mobility cost
c of changing jobs, and that …rms can make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er in period 2: Then in the bad
state the …rm can o¤er u; while in the good state it could o¤er wh
2 ¡c; where wh
2 is the spot wage.
If c is large enough that wh
2 ¡ c · u; then this is equivalent to a long-term contract which has
w2 = u; a contract which turns out to be suboptimal.
11ment the contingent contracts allocation to have a contract (w1;w 2) which satis…es
w2 = u, to ensure e¢cient employment in the bad state for new workers being taken
on.13 In addition, a condition is needed that says in the good state …rms will prefer
raising the wages of all workers to the competitive (auction) rate to leaving them
at w2 and not hiring (it is assumed that the …rm can implement a higher wage
than speci…ed in the contract if it desires since workers will not object). Write ¼
(w;M): =m a x lff(l;M)¡(w+t)lg as a …rm’s optimal one-period pro…ts with value
product shock M facing a wage for all workers of w and having to pay training costs
for all workers. Then this latter condition is
¼(e w
h
2;m h)+t°L ¸ fh(°L) ¡ w2°L; (1)
where e wh
2 is the spot wage in the good state assuming a symmetric allocation (i.e.,
e wh
2 = f0
h(L) ¡ t) and t°L is added to the LHS since the …rm does not have to train
the °L workers inherited from period 1. See Figure 1 (drawn for t =0 ) : a …rm will
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hiring profits = acg
non-hiring profits = abde
Figure 1: The Hiring Decision
the contingent contracts solution is not implementable, after rewriting equation (1)
13If w2 > u, and by assumption the …rm cannot cut the wages of those workers already under
contract, a …rm will only be able to hire new workers at a wage of at least w2 and will therefore
employ an ine¢ciently low number of new workers.
14As mentioned, this is only a necessary condition: a …rm intending to hold its wage to w2 in
the good state would generally do better by choosing period 1 employment higher than L,a n di t
is the pro…t from this strategy which must be less than the L.H.S. of (1). This point is developed
below.
12in terms of the parameters and substituting e wh
2 = f0






¡ 2° (mh ¡ t ¡ u) < 0: (2)
Clearly, for mh su¢ciently high, (2) holds, and thus the contingent contracts equi-
librium cannot be implemented and any equilibrium must be ine¢cient.
If the contingent contracts equilibrium cannot be implemented, what takes its
place? To analyse the possible equilibria, take m and ml to be …xed, and increase
mh, starting from its minimum value u+®L+t; so that in an e¢cient allocation there
is just full employment in the good state (i.e., where e wh
2 = u).A tmh = u+®L+t,
the following is an equilibrium contract: (w¤
1;w¤
2)=( f0(L)¡t;u). This follows from
the fact that it implements the contingent contracts equilibrium with the contingent
contract specifying e w1 = f0(L) ¡ t ´ m ¡ ®L ¡ t, a wage for the bad state e wl
2 = u
and a wage for the good state e wh
2 = u. If all …rms were to o¤er this contract, each
hiring L workers, then each worker receives a utility of w1 (period 2 utility is zero,
whether or not an exogenous separation occurs). All new hires that take place in
period 2 (in either state) take place at a wage of u, and the equilibrium is e¢cient.
Now consider increasing mh above u + ®L + t. The contingent contract would
be as before, except that now e wh
2 = f0
h(L)¡t ´ mh ¡®L¡t>u. This implements
a …rst-best allocation since it guarantees e¢cient employment levels. Suppose that
the same non-contingent contract, (w¤
1;w ¤
2)=( f0(L)¡t;u), as before, is o¤ered. In
the good state, employers would choose either to take on new workers at a wage of
e wh
2 (this is the equilibrium wage for new hires provided all …rms hire), or to make
no hires and pay the incumbents w¤
2 = u. The point is, although the non-contingent
contract does not specify the wage e wh
2 in the good state, because e wh
2 >w ¤
2 the
…rm is able to deviate from the non-contingent contract by o¤ering a higher wage
than that speci…ed. Suppose that all other …rms are choosing to make new hires,
thus implementing the contingent contract with the wage in the good state being
e wh
2. What is the best alternative strategy for a …rm? Since the contractual terms
alone do not determine a worker’s utility (which depends on expectations of a higher
than contracted wage in the good state), explicit assumptions concerning a worker’s
information and beliefs about a particular …rm is needed.
A1. A period 1 worker cannot observe the period 1 employment levels at a
…rm.
13This assumption is most in keeping with the nature of the non-contingent con-
tract (which rules out making the contract contingent on period 2 employment
levels). It implies that a …rm, intending not to hire in the good state, could o¤er the
non-contingent contract (w1;w 2) a n dt a k eo nf e w e ro rm o r ew o r k e r st h a no p t i m a l
for a …rm intending to hire in the good state, since a worker would not be able to
observe such an intended deviation at the time of signing the contract. Note that
the worker would get a lower utility with such a deviant …rm.
I shall make the following assumption about workers’ beliefs in period 1:
A2. If any contract (w1;w 2) is o¤ered, then workers put probability one on
the …rm making new hires in the good state provided it has an incentive to do so,
assuming that it can make as many hires as it wishes in period 1:
2.1 Implementation of the First-Best
I start by deriving the conditions under which the contingent contracts equilibrium
can be implemented. To do this it will be convenient to consider …rst the more
general problem where the contract on o¤er is any feasible (w1;w 2):
Suppose that w2 is su¢ciently high that it allows hiring in the bad state (i.e.,
w2 ¸ u), but not high enough to allow hiring in the good state. Assuming a contract
(w1;w 2) is acceptable to workers, the pro…ts from intending to hire in the good state,
at a wage wh
2; are given by optimizing by choice of n :





where n is a …rm’s choice of period 1 employment, and denote by ¦(w1;w 2;w h
2) the
optimized value of (3) and n(w1;w 2;w h
2) the optimal employment decision. However,
the …rm can ‘deviate’ by not hiring in the good state: in this case it will choose a
period 1 employment level, n, to maximise




where an employment variable written with a prime signi…es ° times the unprimed














14it is an equilibrium for all …rms to o¤er (w¤
1;w¤
2) and hire in the good state. This






the contingent contracts equilibrium is implemented), and the going utility for period
1 workers is that of the contingent contracts equilibrium as (5) and assumption A2
guarantee that workers anticipate a wage of e wh
2 in the good state. Finally, no other
contract can do better than the contingent contracts solution, given the level of
utility that has to be o¤ered to workers.
Solving for the critical value of mh,s a ym¤







(1 + ph)( 1+°2 ph) ¡ 1
´
°p h
+ t + u: (6)
Below m¤
h; the contingent contracts solution can be implemented, but above this
level of mh; it cannot as …rms simply would not choose to hire in the good state;15
instead they would leave wages at w2 = u: Intuitively, at low values of mh the good-
state spot wage is low relative to u; and so only a small increase in the wage is
needed in order to be able make new hires, and the wage-bill implications are small.
At higher values, a large increase is needed and wage-bill considerations will prevent
this from being made.
2.2 Symmetric Ine¢cient Equilibria
A symmetric equilibrium is such that all …rms o¤er the same contract (w1;w 2) to
period-one workers, and follow the same hiring strategy in both periods. To …nd
a symmetric equilibrium when mh >m ¤
h, we need to look for a higher level of
w2 than u; such that there is an incentive to raise wages in the good state to e wh
2
(i.e., so that (5) is satis…ed for the new contract). I shall refer to a contract for
which the …rm has an incentive to hire in the good state as a “hiring contract.”
Roughly speaking, in Figure 1, it is necessary to raise w2 above u u n t i la r e aAi s
brought just back to equality with B (this is only approximate because it assumes
that the deviation strategy involves the same number of period-one hires as the
hiring strategy, whereas in fact the deviation strategy involves labour hoarding).
15Since there is a unique positive solution for m¤
h; and since ¦ is greater than ¦d at mh =
u+®L+t and easily seen to be strictly smaller immediately above m¤
h, it follows that at all values
of mh higher than m¤
h, ¦ is strictly less than ¦d.
15This assumes that any symmetric equilibrium must involve hiring in the good state
at e wh
2: To see this, note that there cannot be a symmetric equilibrium such that w2
is below e wh
2 a n de x p e c t e dt or e m a i nt h e r ei nt h eg o o ds t a t e ,s i n c et h er e s e r v a t i o n
wage of new workers would be at most w2 a n de a c h… r mw o u l dw i s ht oe m p l o ym o r e
than L workers at this wage. Thus there would be an incentive for a …rm to raise
wages a tiny amount above w2 to ensure it can get all the workers it needs (such an
increase has essentially no wage-bill consequences). Likewise it cannot be the case
that the wage rises to some level w0
2 < e wh
2; as again …rms would want to employ
more than L workers at this wage (given they are hiring, they will hire up to the
MVP curve) and would be prepared to pay a small amount more.
For mh >m ¤
h; an equilibrium contract (w1;w2) must in fact satisfy an equality





since if the L.H.S. of (7) were to be strictly larger than the R.H.S., a …rm could
o¤er a slightly lower w2; and workers would still know that the …rm has an incentive
to raise the wage to e wh
2 (= f0
h(L) ¡ t) in the good state. Provided this contract
o¤ers the same utility to workers (so that w1 is raised slightly), they will be happy
accepting it, while because the wage in the bad state is lower, it is more e¢cient
than the putative equilibrium contract and thus yields higher pro…ts. More formally,
given that the other …rms are o¤ering (w1;w2); is it possible to o¤er a credible hiring
contract (w1;w 2) giving workers the same utility but with w2 < w2 and w1 > w1
(which will be more pro…table than (w1;w2))? As just argued, (7) is a necessary
condition to prevent this; the general condition that needs to be satis…ed is, for all
(w1;w 2) o¤ering workers at least the utility from (w1;w2) and with w2 < w2;




Inequality (8) ensures that no such contract would be viewed by workers as a credible
hiring contract. In the Appendix it is demonstrated that at the putative equilibrium
satisfying (7), this condition is satis…ed. Solving for the contract satisfying (7), and




16yields a contract wage of
w2 = mh ¡
®L
³p




Combining (6) and (10) implies that above m¤
h; w2 > u; as expected, and by routine
calculation, w2 < e wh
2:
There is an additional constraint to check, however, before one can conclude
that this is an equilibrium. Given that w2 > u; an alternative deviation strategy for
the …rm is to o¤er a contract which workers anticipate will not involve new hires
in the good state.16 Such a contract, say (w1;w 2), while losing out on pro…table
hires in that state, bene…ts in the bad state from being able to attract workers at
a low wage (optimally w2 = u).17 I shall refer to such a contract as a “non-hiring
contract.” The pro…ts from such a strategy are




where n is the period 1 employment choice (and n0 ´ °n).A s s u m i n g (w1;w2;wh
2)
represents the wage expectations of workers if they accept a contract with a hiring
…rm, let ¦(w1;w2;wh
2) be the optimized value of (11), by choice of n and (w1;w 2);
subject only to the constraint that the contract o¤ers the going utility to period 1
workers:
w1 + °w2 ¸ w1 + °(plw2 + phw
h
2) (12)
(as mentioned, this involves w2 = u); and denote by n(w1;w2;wh
2) the optimal choice
of n: Thus we need to impose the constraint that
¦(w1;w2; e w
h
2) ¸ ¦(w1;w2; e w
h
2): (13)
It turns out (see Appendix) that provided ph ¸ 0:5; a n dt h a t… r m sw a n tt oh i r ei n
the bad state, then (13) always holds. The intuition for this can be seen in Figure 2
which plots the situation most favourable to the non-hiring strategy, namely where
e¢cient employment in the low state just equals L. The hiring strategy makes
16When w2 = u; this can never be a pro…table strategy, hence it cannot prevent the implemen-
tation of the contingent contracts solution studied earlier.
17The other deviation strategy, which also involved not hiring in the good state, su¤ers in
comparison by having a higher second period wage, namely w2 itself, but bene…ts from giving
unsuspecting workers a lower total utility.
17additional pro…ts from new hires equal to area A in the high value state (hiring at
e wh
2); but gains only area B in the low state from hiring at wage w2 > u; whereas
the non-hiring strategy gains B + C in the low state and nothing in the high state.
Since A = B+C; if ph =0 :5; average pro…ts under the hiring strategy will be larger
by 0:5B; and larger a fortiori if ph > 0:5 . (The wage being paid to incumbents can
be ignored as they receive the same present value payment under either scheme.)
This argument is not quite precise as it assumes period-one employment equals L
under either scheme, while in fact the non-hiring strategy will employ slightly more
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Figure 2: Hiring vs. non-hiring strategies
Since w2 > u; it follows that employment in the bad state is smaller than
in the (Pareto-e¢cient) contingent contracts equilibrium, unemployed workers are
involuntarily unemployed in the sense that they envy those (identical workers) who
are being o¤ered employment, and employment is also more variable (there is full
employment in the good state in both cases but more unemployment in the bad
state with non-contingent contracts). We can summarise this in:
Proposition 1 In Case 1, for mh su¢ciently high (mh >m ¤
h), and provided …rms
are hiring in the bad state, there is a symmetric equilibrium contract with period-2
wage w2 > u; and there is ine¢ciently low employment in the bad state (and hence
excessive employment variability).
It can be checked that the solution in terms of wages and employment outcomes
18is invariant to changes in demand shocks and training costs provided they change
by the same amount in period 2, and that the change in the period-one shock m
is a fraction (1 ¡ °) of the change in t: Thus, for su¢ciently large t,e v e ni fi tw a s
technologically feasible, a strategy of replacing the entire workforce at the end of
period 1 will be less pro…table than the strategies considered above.
2.3 Asymmetric Equilibria
The above analysis was valid for the situation (Case 1) where ml was su¢ciently
low that it was e¢cient to have less than full employment in the bad state. In this
section I will show that even for higher values of ml unemployment might still result
in the bad state, although it also turns out that there may no longer be a symmetric
equilibrium.18 Instead there will be an asymmetric equilibrium in which …rms split
into two groups: one following a hiring strategy o¤ers a high period 2 wage and
hires new labour in the good state, while the other follows a non-hiring strategy and
o¤ers a low period 2 wage (= u) and does not hire in the good state. The former
gains by being e¢cient in the good state, the latter by being e¢cient in the bad
state. The symmetric equilibrium analysed in the previous subsection fails as the
non-hiring strategy (w1;w2) becomes more pro…table than the putative equilibrium
strategy (w1;w2) as ml rises, so that (13) is violated. Equilibrium is restored by
having a positive fraction of …rms using the non-hiring strategy, which reduces the
good-state wage (each hiring …rm has to hire more labour and is thus lower down
its MVP curve); this reduces the ine¢ciency of the hiring strategy in the bad state
so that it can be made equally pro…table with the non-hiring strategy.
To solve for this equilibrium, let ¯ denote the fraction of low-wage …rms, wh
2 the
spot wage in the good state, and nh
2 the period 2 employment of high-wage …rms.











2 = L; (15)
18The analysis of this section is generally valid for cases where the non-hiring strategy dominates
the hiring strategy in any putative symmetric equilibrium. For example, if ph < 0:5; or if the slope
of the MVP curve varies with the state, this can happen even in Case 1.





2) ¡ t = w
h
2: (16)











so that …rms are indi¤erent between the hiring and non-hiring strategies. In the
absence of an analytic solution to this system of equations, I have computed the
solution,19 as a function of mh; when other parameters are set as follows: u =
0:1;t=0 :2;m=1 :5;m l =1 :4;° =0 :8;p h =0 :5;®=1 ;L=1 : For these parameter
values, in the …rst-best allocation there is full employment even in the bad state, at
a wage of 0:2 (> u): I …nd that for values of mh between 1:509 and 1:738 there is an
asymmetric equilibrium of the kind just analysed (and no symmetric equilibrium).
Figure 3 shows how both w2 and total employment in the bad state vary as functions
of mh: In this range, w2 is su¢ciently high that aggregate labour demand in the bad
state falls short of supply (=1 ) : As demand in the good state increases, this pushes
up w2; reducing employment in the bad state. At the same time, ¯ varies between
0:225 to 0:334: For mh · 1:509; there is full employment in the bad state (although
any asymmetric equilibrium has an ine¢cient allocation of labour across …rms),
while for mh ¸ 1:738, w2 is su¢ciently high that hiring …rms will choose not to hire
in the bad state, and may even want to lay o¤ workers (see below). The qualitative
properties of this equilibrium remain similar to the symmetric one in that there are
ine¢ciently low numbers of hires in the bad state, and involuntary unemployment in
the sense that in the bad state workers who fail to get a job envy those who succeed
in getting a job with a high-wage …rm, as do those new entrants who accept work
with non-hiring …rms. There is “dualism” for period-2 entrants in the bad state,
in that they can always accept work with a low wage …rm but would prefer to …nd
employment with a high-wage …rm, while period-1 workers are indi¤erent about the
…rm for which they work.
19The analogue of (8) was checked numerically.
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Figure 3: Employment and Wages in Asymmetric Equilibria
3 Layo¤s and Mobility
In this section layo¤s and ex post mobility of labour are added to the model. I
maintain the assumption that contracts are binding, but a laid-o¤ worker is free to
look for employment with another …rm, and for simplicity it is assumed that there
are no mobility costs. The speci…cation of shocks di¤ers in two ways from what has
gone before. First, it is assumed that there is an additional state which is su¢ciently
bad that …rms will choose to layo¤ workers. This (“very bad”) state will (again) be
assumed to be symmetric across …rms, so that this change to the model, by itself,
will not lead to any ex-post mobility (no …rm will be hiring laid-o¤ workers as all
su¤er equally). The second variation is that in the good state a fraction of …rms will
receive a bad shock (the same as in the very bad state for simplicity). Such …rms
will want to lay o¤ workers, who in turn will be able to …nd work elsewhere.
I maintain the assumption that workers are not able to observe general market
conditions (or contracts cannot be conditioned on them), which implies that the
…rm cannot condition layo¤ pay on the state. If the only layo¤ state were the
symmetric (very bad) one, then it would be desirable to fully insure workers against
unemployment as this would create the right incentives for the …rm: it would only
layo¤ workers if their marginal product falls short of their disutility of work.20 On
20The argument in the text suggests that if there was no asymmetric layo¤ state, employment
would be e¢cient in the symmetric layo¤ state. From simulations, this is approximately correct,
21the other hand, if the only layo¤ state were the asymmetric one, a …rm should pay
less layo¤ pay, since the opportunity cost of the worker is equal to the outside wage.
It would then be e¢cient to set layo¤ pay so that the e¤ective cost to retaining the
worker—the …rm’s wage plus layo¤ pay—is equal to the outside wage.21 If all wages
were equal, this would imply zero layo¤ pay. (In fact the outside wage will be higher
because the contract wage is always lower than the spot wage in the good state;
thus a somewhat negative layo¤ pay would be called for given the assumption that
mobility costs are zero.) When both symmetric and asymmetric states are present,
and since the contract can only specify a single (i.e., non-contingent) layo¤ pay, a
compromise between these two extremes will generally be optimal, so in the very bad
state, layo¤ pay will o¤er less than full insurance, and layo¤s will be involuntary.
While none of the above has anything to do with the wage-bill argument per se,
it turns out that the fact that the wage-bill argument pushes the period-two wage
above u implies that more layo¤s are made in the symmetric very bad state than
would otherwise be the case. The reason for this is that as layo¤ pay is low, the cost
of retaining a worker is close to the contract wage rather than the true opportunity
cost (u), and so excessive layo¤s are made. As mh rises and the wage-bill e¤ect
grows, the contract wage increases and this e¤ect is exacerbated.
Let pvb be the probability of the very bad state, in which all …rms receive the
MVP shock mvb (with revenue function fvb(¢)); and let phb be the probability of the
good state times the probability of receiving the shock mvb in the good state, while
phg is the corresponding probability of receiving mh in the good state. The l¡state
is as before, and pvb + pl + phb + phg =1 :
Assume that in vb-a n dhb-states, layo¤s do occur, and, as before, new hires
are made in the l-state but some new workers are left unemployed, while there is
full employment in the good state. Then if the contract (w1;w 2;w L) is o¤ered (and
acceptable) to workers the pro…ts from intending to hire in the good state with the
although there turn out to be fractionally too few layo¤s. The reason is that layo¤ pay can
also be used to discourage a non-hiring deviation strategy; since this involves hiring a larger
period 1 workforce, more layo¤s are needed in the symmetric layo¤ state, and setting wL too high
discriminates more against this strategy.
21By “e¢cient” here is meant in the relationship between worker and …rm; e¢cient layo¤ deci-
sions allow the …rm to increase pro…ts given the going utility that has to be o¤ered to workers.
22good shock, at a wage wh
2; are given by optimizing by choice of n; nL :





+(pvb + phb)(fvb(nL) ¡ w2nL ¡ wL(n
0 ¡ nL));
where n is a …rm’s choice of period 1 employment, and nL is the choice of employment
in the layo¤ states (which is the same in both cases as the shock is the same).
Denote by ¦(w1;w 2;w L;wh
2) the optimized value of (19) and n(w1;w 2;w L;w h
2) and
nL(w1;w 2;w L;w h
2) the optimal employment decisions. The pro…ts from deviating by
not intending to hire in the good state are given by:




+(pvb + phb)(fvb(nL) ¡ w2nL ¡ wL(n
0 ¡ nL));
where n is the choice of period 1 employment, nL is the choice of employment in the
layo¤ states, and denote by ¦d(w1;w 2;w L) the optimized value of (20).





2) ¡ t = wh
2; where nh
2 is the choice of employment
when the shock is mh with wh
2 the spot wage in the good state, and phb(phb +
phg)¡1nL(w1;w 2;w L;w h
2)+phg(phb + phg)¡1nh
2 = L; which is the labour market
clearing condition in the good state. In addition, (w1;w2;wL) must maximise
¦(w1;w 2;w L;wh
2), taking wh
2 as given, subject to the constraints that ¦(w1;w 2;w L;w h
2)=
¦d(w1;w 2;w L); as before, and that the utility o¤ered by the contract, w1+°(pvb(¸(u+
wL)+(1¡¸)w2)+plw2+phgwh
2+phb(¸(wh
2+wL)+(1¡¸)w2)); equals the going rate (the
same expression evaluated at (w1;w2;wL)); where ¸; af u n c t i o no f(w1;w 2;w L;w h
2); is
the layo¤ probability (°n(w1;w 2;w L;w h
2) ¡ nL(w1;w 2;w L;w h
2))=°n(w1;w 2;w L;w h
2):
Again resort is made to numerical solutions. For illustration purposes, parame-
ter values are set to u =0 :1;t=0 ;m=1 :3;m vb =0 :6;m l =1 :4;°=0 :7;p vb =0 :1;
pl =0 :3;p hg =0 :5;p hb =0 :1;®=1and L =1 : Figure 4 plots the solution, over
the range of values for mh for which w2 > u and hires take place in the low state,
as a function of mh, for the following variables: w2; unemployment in the low state
(which equals w2 in this case), and unemployment in the symmetric layo¤ state.
The situation in the low state is very much as before; increases in mh push up the
second-period contract wage, with the result that in the low state fewer workers are
taken on. There is, however, a similar (but smaller) e¤ect on employment in the
23symmetric layo¤ state, even though each …rm is laying o¤ workers. Because the wage
is higher, the incentive to layo¤ would be higher provided layo¤ pay is unchanged.
In fact layo¤ pay increases with mh too, but at a slower rate than w2 because other-
wise in the asymmetric layo¤ state, the e¤ective cost of retaining a worker (w2¡wL)
would be unchanged despite the true opportunity cost, wh
2; increasing with mh; the
outcome is thus a compromise between ine¢ciently high layo¤s in the symmetric
state and ine¢ciently low layo¤s in the asymmetric state.22
unemployment in layoff state








Figure 4: Wages and Unemployment with Layo¤s
4 Related Literature
As mentioned earlier, the most common use of the equal pay for equal work as-
sumption has been in non-competitive labour market models (such as union-…rm
wage-bargaining models) where the outside wage is always beneath that paid to
incumbents (so that what I have called the wagebill argument is not relevant).
For example Carruth and Oswald (1987) make this assumption. In their paper an
e¢cient union-…rm bargain implies (for relatively high levels of demand) that an
increase in demand can result in outsiders (to the union) being taken on at a wage
which is constant and (by assumption) equal to that received by insiders. A related
22Similar qualitative results would be achieved if zero layo¤ pay was imposed, rather than allowing
for layo¤ pay to be chosen optimally as here; unemployment would increase at the same rate in
both the symmetric very bad state and the low state.
24argument is found in Gottfries (1992), who also considers e¢cient union bargaining,
analysing a model in which the equal pay assumption is imposed (a major contrast
with the Carruth and Oswald (1987) paper is that Gottfries has an explicit stochastic
model with nominal and real shocks). He shows that nominal contracting, provided
all …rms use it, can lead to minimal or even zero private losses, mainly because
the insiders (the original union members prior to any expansion of the workforce)
are relatively una¤ected by shocks which translate into ‡uctuations in hiring (as
in this paper, he concentrates on situations where there are new hires, ruling out
layo¤s); for example an increase in (aggregate) demand can lead to a decrease in
the optimal wage because it is desirable, due to the equal pay assumption, as the
workforce expands, to pay a lower wage (higher wages paid to outsiders are pure loss
from the point of view of the two bargaining parties, and so the larger the number
of outsiders, the lower the wage should be)23,b u ti tc a na l s ol e a dt oa ni n c r e a s e
in the wage if the …rm is su¢ciently risk-averse, so that pro…ts do not ‡uctuate
too procyclically. The point is that for reasonable parameterizations, having a …xed
nominal contract will not be too far from being optimal. Thus, in both Carruth and
Oswald (1987) and Gottfries (1992), the equal pay assumption can lead to some form
of wage rigidity. The argument, however, is quite di¤erent from that of the current
paper. Both papers (and the literature generally) di¤er from this one, as far as the
equal pay assumption is concerned, by imposing that the outsiders have reservation
wages below any wage that insiders might receive—even in “good” states of the
world. Wages are kept constant in the face of rising demand to prevent too much
surplus “leaking” to outsider. These papers are thus …rmly in the insider-outsider
tradition where union members (insiders) are always able to earn strictly more than
the outsiders’ reservation wage.24 By contrast, here there is a competitive market
for labour and in good states of the world, the outsiders’ reservation wage is higher
than that needed to be paid to insiders; the equal pay assumption also bites in such
situations when the …rm decides to hire outsiders.
The assumption has not played much of a role in the implicit contract literature.
The canonical model assumes that there is a …xed labour pool for each …rm, or at
least once a worker is attached to a …rm it becomes ex post immobile; moreover
23See also Oswald (1993) on this point.
24The equal pay assumption, combined with the insider-outsider model, can lead to hysterisis
in unemployment; see, e.g., Blanchard and Summers (1986), Gottfries and Horn (1987), Lindbeck
and Snower (1987), Burda (1990) and Gottfries and Westermark (1998).
25the models generally last one-period with no new workers entering the market after
contracts are signed; consequently there is no possibility of new hires from outside
a …rm’s existing workforce (see, e.g., Azariadis (1975) and Rosen (1985); Baily
(1974) considers a dynamic model but again new hires from outside the …rm are
not considered). One exception is Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980), who consider, in an
otherwise fairly standard complete information set-up, the e¤ect of ex post labour
mobility between …rms after the state of nature is revealed.25 They impose the
equal pay assumption and obtain the result, in a two-industry model, that if layo¤s
are to occur, it must be in a situation where one industry receives a good shock
and the other a bad shock. Counterintuitively, if both receive bad shocks, then
no layo¤s can occur (in contrast to the model studied here where ine¢ciently low
employment and excessive layo¤s can occur when all …rms receive a bad shock).
A second exception is Polemarchakis and Weiss (1978) who consider mobility in a
general equilibrium model with asymmetric sectoral shocks. They analyse, in a two-
sector full employment model, the e¢ciency or otherwise of employment ‡ows, and
demonstrate the possibility of multiple equilibria. In one equilibrium, wages are rigid
in the face of shocks, and the reason why …rms in one sector facing a positive shock
do not increase wages to bid workers away from the other (negative shock) sector
is precisely a wage-bill argument of the type considered here.26 The implications of
wage rigidity are, however, quite di¤erent from those considered here; within each
sector employment variability is reduced in the constant wage equilibrium relative
to the ‡exible wage equilibrium and the …rst best.
The equal pay for equal work assumption has also been used in search models of
the labour market, although the canonical model of the matching literature treats
each …rm-worker match independently (typically with match surplus being split
between the two parties), so that there is no imposition of equal wages across all
employees of each …rm. Exceptions to this include Manning (1996) (building on the
work of Albrecht and Axell (1984) and Mortensen and Burdett (1989)), who imposes
an assumption of equal pay within a company, even though productivities vary in a
25Other papers which include ex post mobility in an implicit contracting world include Arnott,
Hosios, and Stiglitz (1988) and Meyer (1987), which only consider the possibility of workers leaving
the …rm, and not the possibility of new hires (which is crucial here) and Hosios (1986), which allows
for new hires but does not impose equal pay.
26This is the only example of which I am aware of a similar use of a wage-bill argument as
presented in the current paper.
26known fashion across workers.27
5C o n c l u d i n g C o m m e n t s
This paper has investigated the consequences of a fair pay restriction which rules
out discriminating either against or in favour of new hires. In conjunction with
an assumption which limits the degree to which wages can be conditioned on the
state of nature, the fair pay restriction implies that wages can be less ‡exible, and
employment more variable, than would be the case in the absence of the restriction.
Moreover involuntary unemployment can result, and if layo¤s are required, they can
be excessive and again involuntary.
While the labour market was assumed to be competitive, it would be desirable to
see whether similar results hold when there is imperfect competition, for example,
with monopsonistic labour markets. In the competitive model, the …rm is faced
with a stark choice when the spot wage is above the contract wage: either leave
the wage where it is and fail to make new hires, or raise the wage up to the spot
wage. In a monopsonistic market, the choice would be how far to increase the wage;
wagebill considerations will presumably lead to a smaller increase than otherwise.
The actions of one …rm moderating its wage increases might lead to an externality
in that the reservation wage of workers is lower than it otherwise would be, so that
other …rms will not have to raise wages so far in order to attract a given number
of new workers (this e¤ect is absent in the current model), thus moderating further
the size of wage increases. This is currently work in progress. A further desirable
extension would be to derive the fair pay restriction from more basic assumptions,
rather than imposing it as here.
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6 Appendix
(1) First, it is shown that a non-hiring strategy is never preferable to the equilibrium
hiring strategy. For notational simplicity, de…ne A ´
p
(1 + ph) and B ´
p
(1 + °2ph):
The (nonnegative) solution to (7) and (9) yields, along with (10),
w1 = m + °m h ¡ t ¡ ° u +( phB)
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) ¡ °p l ph B (mh ¡ t ¡ u)g
and
w1 = m¡®L¡(1 ¡ °) t
30After substituting in these solutions into (3) and (11), we get the following (unwieldy)
expression for ¦(w1;w2; e wh
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2 (ml ph ¡ pl (2 + °p h)( t + u))):
The second derivative of ¦(w1;w2; e wh
2)¡¦(w1;w2; e wh
2) with respect to mh (where w1;w2
are being treated as depending on the parameters of the model) is
pl (1 ¡ °2 +2°2 ph)
® + ®°2 ph
;
which is positive and hence any stationary point (w.r.t. mh) is a minimum. To determine
whether ¦(w1;w2; e wh
2) ¡ ¦(w1;w2; e wh
2) can be negative, minimize then with respect to
mh , which leads to the following minimized value:
(2® (1 + °2 (¡1+2ph)))
¡1 (®2 L2 (ph ¡ 2°p h + °2 (¡pl + ph
2))
¡2®°Lp l (1 + °p h)( ¡ml + t + u) ¡ pl (1 + °2 ph)( ¡ml + t + u)
2:
(22)
Evaluating (22) at the lowest value of ml allowed in Case 1 (i.e., ®°L + u + t) yields
®(¡1+°)
2 L2 (1 ¡ °2 pl) ph
2+°2 (¡2+4ph)
;
which is strictly positive. On the other hand, at the largest value of ml allowed in Case 1





which is nonnegative provided ph ¸ 0:5. Also, the second derivative of (22) with respect
to ml is given by
¡
pl (1 + °2 ph)
® (1 + °2 (¡1+2ph))
< 0;
so that (22) is necessarily positive at all intervening values for ml: So far, this assumes
an interior solution for n: In fact, as mh increases, then n declines (the reason being that
31the equilibrium contract o¤ers period 2 wages higher in both states by the increase in mh,
while the marginal employee under the (w1;w2) contract—which must o¤er an equivalent
increase in expected utility to period 1 employees—generates extra income equal to the
increase in mh only in the good state, and so this employee becomes unpro…table), so it
is necessary to check that n remains positive. Solve for the critical mh (in terms of the
other parameters), say mh; such that in equilibrium …rms just choose not to hire in the
bad state:
mh =
°m l ph + ®L(¡1 ¡ °2 ph + AB)
°p h
: (23)
This is the highest value of mh under consideration. Substitute this value for mh back
into (21), yielding
n =
®L(1 + pl°2 + °p h) ¡ °p l (ml¡t ¡ u)
® (1 + °2 ph)
>L
(since ml ¡ t ¡ u · ®L; and using ph ¸ 0:5): Consequently n is indeed interior, and
thus the computations above are valid. It follows, …nally, that (13) holds for all parameter
values in Case 1, provided ph ¸ 0:5:
(2) To consider the question of whether it is possible pro…tably to o¤er some other
contract which workers anticipate will involve hiring in the good state, …rst note, as argued
intuitively in the text, that such a contract must involve a lower period 2 wage than w2:
To see this formally, consider choosing a period 2 wage b w2; with b w1 being determined by
the equal utility condition b w1 + °(pl b w2 + phe wh
2)=w1 + °(plw2 + ph e wh
2); say b w1(b w2);
a n dc o n s i d e rt h ev a l u eo fp r o … t s¦(b w1(b w2); b w2; e wh
2): After straightforward manipulation,







Moreover, consider the value of b w2; say b w¤
2; which is su¢ciently high so that the …rm just
chooses not to hire in the bad state. This is found by setting optimal employment in the
bad state equal to °n(b w1(b w2); b w2; e wh
2) (where n(¢) is as de…ned below (3)):






¡1+2ph + °p h
2+pl AB
¢
¡°pl ph (mh ¡ t ¡ b w
¤
2)g:
As b w2 is reduced below w2 (and b w1 increased above w1), n is also reduced as period 1
employment satis…es MVP ¡ t = b w1 ¡ °t (the °t term represents a saving on period 2
training costs); at the same time optimal employment in the bad state will rise, so the …rm
will hire more in the bad state; thus b w¤
2 > w2: At b w¤
2 we have, again by straightforward
calculation, d¦(b w1(b w2); b w2; e wh
2)=d(b w2) jb w2=b w¤
2=0 ; which implies from (24) that for all
32lower values of b w2; ¦(b w1(b w2); b w2; e wh
2) is decreasing in b w2, and for all higher values;
¦(b w1(b w2); b w2; e wh
2) is constant in b w2 s i n c ea st h e r ea r en oh i r e si nt h eb a ds t a t e ,t h e r ei s
no cost to higher levels of b w2 (it is exactly o¤set by a lower b w1):
So a …rm would never want to increase b w2 above w2; and would like to shift the wage
pro…le towards period 1. Is this is credible? To show that it is not, I need to demonstrate
that at lower period 2 wages the incentive to deviate by not hiring in the good state
is strictly positive, i.e., (8) holds. To do this, consider Á(b w2) ´ ¦(b w1(b w2); b w2; e wh
2) ¡
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; (25)
which is greater than or less than 0 according as ph is less or greater than (3 + 2°2 ¡ p
9+4°2)=(2°2) (which lies between 0:6 and 0:7).T h u s Á(b w2) is either convex or
concave (or both). Evaluating Á
0










so at least locally, cutting b w2 below w2 is not credible. Consequently if ph ¸ (3 +2°2 ¡ p
9+4°2)=(2°2) (so that Á(b w2) is concave) it follows that Á(b w2) < 0 for all b w2 < w;
as was to be shown. The case ph < (3 + 2°2 ¡
p
9+4°2)=(2°2) is more tricky. First,
consider the value of Á(b w2) at b w2 = u: Evaluating this at m¤
h (the maximum value for
mh such that the contingent contracts solution is implementable; see (6)) yields a value
of 0 (recall that this is the de…ning characteristic of m¤





= ° (® + ®°2 ph)
¡1 f®L(1 + °2 pl)( 1¡ 2ph ¡ pl AB)
+° (2 + °2 pl
2 ¡ 3ph) ph (mh ¡ t ¡ u)g
; (26)












33which is negative (recall that ph ¸ :5): Substitute mh (see (23)) into optimal period 1 em-
ploymentn(b w1(b w2); b w2; e wh
2) (the optimal employment choice for the contract (b w1(b w2); b w2)
assuming new hires will be made in the good state) at b w2 = u :
n(b w1(u);u; e w
h
2) jmh=mh=
®L(1 + °2pl) ¡ °p l (ml ¡ t ¡ u)
®
:
Since, by assumption in Case 1, ®L ¸ ml¡t¡u; this expression is at least L(1¡°pl(1¡
°)) > 0: (Thus, as mh gets larger, the equilibrium utility for each worker is increasing,
but for the contract with b w2 = u; b w1 is not so large such that it is optimal to employ no
workers in period 1:) It follows that optimal employment should the …rm o¤er (b w1(u);u)
and plan not to hire in the good state is also positive, since it must be at least equal to
n(b w1(u);u; e wh
2) (the nth worker employed is pro…table given that the …rm plans to hire in
the good state; should it plan not to hire, this worker would have the same value in period
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which has a maximum value (as ml is varied in Case 1) at ml ¡t¡u = ®L: Substituting





as the R.H.S. of (25), which is thus positive. To summarise:
dÁ(u)
dmh is negative at m¤
h;





dmh must be negative at all values for
mh in between m¤
h and mh: Since Á(u)=0at m¤
h;Á (u) < 0 for all mh in between m¤
h and
mh: Finally, since Á(b w2) is convex, it now follows from Á(w2)=0that Á(b w2) < 0 for all
u · b w2 < w2 and for all mh in between m¤
h and mh:
34